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HE general use of surety bonds in connection with construction
projects has produced many difficult problems relating to the
legal protection given by such bonds to persons furnishing labor,
materials, and other aids to construction. One important question is that
of interpretation, a question of fact, though in most instances to be de-
cided by the court. Another question is whether the law will give effect
to a properly manifested intention to vest rights in such third-person-
beneficiaries. In treating of these problems it has been deemed best to
consider first bonds conditioned on the payment of persons furnishing
labor or material; secondly, other types of bonds, in which an intention to
protect such persons is not so dearly manifested; thirdly, certain diffi-
culties, such as the conflict of interest between the owner and persons
furnishing labor or materials when one bond with limited liability is given;
fourthly, the rights of laborers and materialmen on certain special types
of bond, including those given by subcontractors, indemnitors, or rein-
surers; and lastly, the effect of collateral transactions or conduct on the
distinct right of the laborer or materialman.
I. BONDS CONDITIONED ON THE PAYMENT OF CLAIMS FOR LABOR
AND MATERIALS
Such bonds may be classified according as they are or are not required
by statute, and according as the property is free from liens for labor or
materials, whether of public or private ownership, or is subject to lien,
as under many statutes in the case of private ownership.
* This article will be cbncluded in the next issue of the REvImv.
f Professor of Law, Harvard-Law School.
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A. BONDS GIVEN IN COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTE WHEN THE PROPERTY
IS OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OR OTHERWISE FREE FROM I LIEN
In cases falling under this heading,' the owner is commonly the United
States, a state, a municipality, or other public body,2 which enters into
a contract with the principal for the performance of a work of construc-
tion, maintenance, or the like, and in obedience to statute the principal
gives to the owner a surety bond conditioned, either directly or by refer-
ence to the contract, on the payment of persons furnishing labor or
materials. Several different situations may be considered:
(I) If the statute provides that the person furnishing labor or materials
shall have rights on a bond so conditioned, 3 or may sue or have the right
to sue on it, 4 or that it shall be for his use or benefit,s then the material-
, Many authorities on questions treated in this article are to be found in an excellent note
in 77 A.L.R. 21 (1932).
2 For treatment of the implied exclusion of public property used for public purposes from
the operation of statutes providing for mechanics' liens, see Hutchinson v. Krueger, 34 Okla.
23, 25, 124 Pac. 591, 592 (1912); see notes, Ann. Cas. 1914C io3, id. 19i3A 762; 35 L.R.A. '4',
(1897), 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 261 (199o), 41 id. 3IS (r912).
Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. v. Board of Education, iS F. (2d) 317 (C.C.A. 4th 1926) (bond
referring to contract).
4 United States, for the use of Hill v. American Surety Co., 200 U.S. 197, 26 S. Ct. i68, 5o
L. Ed. 437 (i9o6) (28 Stat. 278, c. 280 (1894); 40 U.S.C.A. § 270 (1928)); Mankin v. United
States, 2IS U.S. 533, 30 S. Ct 174, 54 L. Ed. 315 (1910) (33 Stat. 81i, c. 778, (1905); 40
U.S.C.A. § 270 (1928)); Gage v. Road Imp. District, 153 Ark. 321, 240 S.W. 427 (1922);
French v. Powell, 135 Cal. 636, 68 Pac. 92 (1902); Peake v. United States, I6 App. D.C. 415
(i9oo) (bond incorporating contract by reference); United States, to use of Turover v. Tomp-
kins Co., 63 App. D.C. 332, 72 F. (2d) 383 (1934) (lumber supplied for concrete forms and con-
sumed in the work); Dewey v. The State, ex rel. McCollum, 91 Ind. 173 (1883); State of Kan-
sas, ex rel. Winkle Terra Cotta Co. v. United States F. & G. Co., 322 Mo. 121, 14 S.W. (2d) 576
(1929); West v. Detroit Fid. & Sur. Co., 118 Neb. 544, 548, 225 N.W. 673, 675 (1929) (Comp.
St. 1922, § 8526); Easton School District v. Continental Cas. Co., 304 Pa. 67, 155 Ati. 93
(i93i); Webb v. Freng, x8i Wis. 39, 194 N.W. 155 (1923) ("any party in interest" may main-
tain an action in his own name against contractor and sureties); Hunter Machinery Co. v.
Southern Sur. Co., 193 Wis. 218, 214 N.W. 613 (1927) ("benefit of the person furnishing labor
or materials, who may sue").
The statutes of the United States (33 Stat. 811, c. 778 (z9o5), amending 28 Stat. 278,
c. 280 (1894); 4o U.S.C.A. § 270 (1928)) give a right of action in the name of the United States
for the use of a person furnishing labor or materials, established a preference in favor of the
United States, and provide for the intervention of all persons furnishing labor and materials to
obtain ratable distribution among them of the penal sum of the bond, and for bringing the ac-
tion in the United States courts irrespective of the amount in controversy and not elsewhere.
s Los Angeles Stone Co. v. National Sur. Co., 178 Cal. 247, 173 Pac. 79 (ig8); Hub Hard-
ware Co. v. Aetna Acc. & Liab. Co., 178 Cal. 264, 173 Pac. 81 (1918); Philip Carey Co. v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 201 Iowa IO63, zo66, 206 N.W. 8o8, 8og, 47 A.L.R. 495, 498 (1927); Board
of Education v. Grant, 107 Mich. 151, 64 N.W. io5o (I895); St. Paul v. Butler, 30 Minn. 459,
16 N.W. 362 (1883); Morton v. Power, 33 Minn. 521, 24 N.W. 194 (1885); Dawson v. North-
western Const. Co., 137 Minn. 352, 163 N.W. 772 (1917) ("use of the obligee and of all persons
doing work," etc.); J. Jacob Shannon & Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., io6 N.J.L. 200, 148 AUt.
738 (1930). 63 A.L.R. 1381 (1929).
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man,6 or his assignee, will have an enforceable right thereon against the
surety, or the contractor and surety, according as one or both may have
executed the bond.7 It is so held, even though the bond elsewhere pro-
vides that no right of action shall accrue to or for the use of anyone other
than the obligee; such a provision is void because contrary to the statute.8
Moreover, the person furnishing labor or materials may maintain an
action on the bond in a court of another state,9 or may have his claim
thereon allowed in receivership or insolvency proceedings in another
state. 0 Furthermore, an additional provision to the effect that the bond
may be assigned by the owner to materialmen does not exclude the rise
of a right and maintenance of an action without such assignment." These
rules are obviously sound since it is dearly the legislative intent that
persons furnishing labor or material to the contractor shall have direct
rights on the surety bond.
Certain questions remain to be answered as to the coverage of the bond.
It is generally held that subcontractors are within the favor of the bond
and have the same rights as do those who merely furnish labor or ma-
terials;" likewise persons furnishing labor or materials to a subcontrac-
tor, 3 or to one who received an assignment of the contract from the
6 Statements in this sub-topic concerning a materialman are equally applicable to a person
furnishing labor and, if the coverage of the bond goes so far, to persons furnishing supplies,
machinery, funds, and the like.
7 Royal ind. Co. v. Cliff Wood & Co., io F. (2d) 5oi (C.C.A. 6th 1926) (Throckmorton's
Ohio Code 1929, § 2365, 1-3); State Bank of Duluth v. Heney, 40 Minn. 145, 147, 41 N.W.
411, 412 (1889) (dichum); and cases in notes 3, 4, and 5, supra. See many other authorities
collected in 77 A.L.R. 21, 142-148 (1932).
3 Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. v. Board of Education, 15 F. (2d) 317 (C.C.A. 4 th 1926) (bond
referred to contract containing undertaking to pay claims for labor or material).
Contrast a situation in which the bond is not required by statute. Infra, notes 51-87.
9 State of Kansas v. United States F. & G. Co., 322 Mo. 121, 14 S.W. (2d) 576 (1929);
Clark Plastering Co. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 259 N.Y. 424,429, 182 N.E. 71, 72 (1932); Hunter
Machinery Co. v. Southern Sur. Co., 193 Wis. 218, 214 N.W. 613 (1927).
10 National Roofing Tile Co. v. Macdonald, Receiver, 94 Conn. 240, io8 At. 726 (I919).
xx National Roofing Tile Co. v. Macdonald, supra, note io.
- Chicago Bonding & Sur. Co. v. United States, 261 Fed. 266 (C.C.A. 7 th i919); Peake v.
United States, z6 App. D. C. 415 (19oo); United States, for use of Croli, v. Jack, 124 Mich. 210,
82 N.W. 1049 (I9OO). 77 A.L.R. 21, 148 (1932).
13 Hill v. American Sur. Co., 200 U.S. 197, 26 S. Ct. 168, 5o L. Ed. 437 (19o6) (though bond
read "that such contractor or contractors shall make payments to all persons supplying him or
them," etc.); Mankin v. United States, 215 U.S. 533, 30 S. Ct. 174, 54 L. Ed. 315 (IgXo) (same);
State v. Southern Sur. Co., 221 Ala. 113, 127 So. 805 (1930) (overruling American Sur. Co. v.
United States, 127 Ala. 349, 28 So. 664 (igoo)); Pavarini & Wyne, Inc. v. Title Guar. & Sur.
Co., 36 App. D. C. 348 (1911) (same); General Motors Truck Co. v. Phillips, 191 Minn. 467,
254 N.W. s8o (1934); Newton A. K. Bugbee & Co., Inc. v. Consolidated Ind. & Ins. Co., 'x'
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original contractor, 4 or to a subcontractor with the assignee of the orig-
inal contractor, 5 or to a surety of a subcontractor who has taken over
that part of the work after the insolvency of the latter. 6 These results
are sound enough if the condition of the bond is expressed to be for the
payment of all persons furnishing labor or material for the doing of the
work required by the principal contract; 7 but are of less obvious propriety
when the condition protects only persons furnishing labor or material
to the principal contractor for such work."
N.J.L. 323, z68 Ati. 388 (1933) (condition to pay claims of subcontractors, materialmen and
laborers; benefit of materialmen and laborers). 7oA.L.R. 308,309 (I93x); 77 id. 21, I48 (I932).
If, however, certain materials had been furnished to the subcontractor on the sole credit of
the contractor, it being agreed between them that the value thereof should be deducted from
the subcontract price, the judgment rendered in favor of the subcontractor against the surety
would be limited to the difference. Consolidated Ind. Co. v. Salmon & Cowin, Inc., 64 F. (2d)
756 (C.C.A. 5th 1933) (probably).
'4 Hub Hardware Co. v. Aetna Acc. & Liab. Co., 178 Cal. 264, 173 Pac. 8i (1918).
s French v. Powell, 135 Cal. 636, 68 Pac. 92 (1902) ("any materials or supplies furnished
for the performance of the work contracted to be done").
In American Guar. Co. v. Cincinnati Iron & Steel Co., ix5 Ohio St. 626, 634, 155 N.E-
389, 392 (1927), protection was even extended to one who furnished materials to a materi-
alman, which materials were incorporated into the work. Contra: Garbutt v. Chappe, 131 Cal.
App. 284, 294, 21 Pac. (2d) 594, 598 (933); Claycraft Co. v. John Bowen Co., 1g1 N.E. 403
(Mass. 1934) (interpreting Mass. G. L. 1932 c. 149, § 29, and holding that the words "payment
by the contractor or subcontractors" for labor and materials used in public construction do not
protect one furnishing materials to a materialman).
In Glades County v. Detroit Fid. & Sur. Co., 57 F. (2d) 449, 454 (C.C.A. 5 th, 1932), the
materialman recovered for material furnished to the contractor which came into the possession
of the county and was turned over by it to a second contractor who completed the work after
default of the first.
,6 Philadelphia v. H. C. Nichols Co., 214 Pa. 265, 273, 63 At. 886, 888 (igo6).
It is obvious, however, that a materialman cannot recover for materials sold to the con-
tractor, later sold under execution, and eventually resold to the person completing the work,
and used by him therein. Commonwealth to use of American Steel and Wire Co., v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 309 Pa. 263, 163 Ati. 530 (1932).
17 Shuptrine v. Jackson Equipment & Service Co., 168 Miss. 464, 150 So. 795 (I933).
Obviously, one who furnishes materials to a subcontractor will be protected if it is so specifi-
cally provided. Davy Fuel & Supply Co. v. S. R. Ratcliffe Plastering Co., 260 Mich. 276, 244
N.W. 472 (1932) (interpreting 3 Mich. Comp. Laws 1929, §§ 13132-13134).
is Nevertheless, in Hill v. American Sur. Co., 200 U.S. 197, 26 S. Ct. i68, 5o L. Ed. 437
(i9o6), in Mankin v. United States, 215 U.S. 533, 30 S. Ct. 174, 54 L. Ed. 315 (igio), and in
Pavarini & Wyne, Inc. v. Title Guar. & Sur. Co., 36 App. D.C. 348 (1g11), such a bond and
statute were held to protect persons furnishing materials to a subcontractor. In the Hill case
the court reasoned (i) that the purpose of the statute as manifested by its title and cer-
tain provisions required the protection of all persons furnishing labor or materials entering
into the work of construction; and (2) this liberal interpretation is not harsh on the contractor
and his surety for they could have easily exacted an indemnifying bond from the subcontractor.
The court did not advert to the ease with which the materialman might have protected himself
by requiring real or personal security of the subcontractor.
In the Pennsylvania case of Philadelphia v. Wiggins, 227 Pa. 343, 76 Afl. 31 (igio), the
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(2) Moreover, if it is the bond, rather than the statute, which directly
or by reference to the contract contains a provision for the accrual of a
substantive right, a cause of action, or use or benefit to the person fur-
nishing labor or materials, by the great weight of authority, he or his
assignee will have a substantive right and an appropriate remedy against
the surety, or the principal and surety, according as one or both may have
executed the bond.19 Such is the expressed intention of the parties to the
bond, and a corresponding legislative intent may be found, it seems, in
the provision of the statute that the bond shall be conditioned on the
payment of such claims.
(3) By the decisive preponderance of authority, although neither stat-
ute nor bond provides for the accrual to the person furnishing labor or
materials of substantive right, cause of action, use or benefit, still, the
statute having required a bond conditioned on his payment and such a
bond having been executed, he is generally held to have a right (and an
appropriate remedy) thereon.20 By conditioning the bond on his payment
the parties thereto have sufficiently manifested their intent that he shall
have this right. The legislature, by requiring the bond to be so condi-
tioned, has manifested an intent that when executed it should give rise
to the right, and has thus created the right. In supporting this conclusion
the courts often reason with considerable force that the purpose of the
bond virtually followed an ordinance of the city of Philadelphia in being conditioned on the
payment of "all persons supplying the contractor with labor and materials, whether as a sub-
contractor or otherwise, in the prosecution of the work," and a person supplying materials to a
subcontractor was properly held to have rights on the bond. And see Philadelphia v. H. C.
Nichols Co., 214 Pa. 265, 63 At. 886 (igo6).
Contrast the interpretation placed on the Mechanic's Lien Act of Illinois (Smith-Hurd Rev.
St. 1931, c. 82, § 23) by Alexander Lumber Co. v. Coberg, 356 Ill. 49, I9o N.E. 99 (934), in
which case a statute giving a lien on the fund to "any person who shall furnish material, etc.,
to any contractor having a contract with any municipality" was held not to protect persons
furnishing materials to a subcontractor.
19 Chaffin v. Nichols, 211 IIl. App. iog, 114 (1918) (provision in bond that it was for the use
and benefit of the materialman and might be sued on by him); Commonwealth v. National Sur.
Co., 253 Pa. 5, 97 Atl. 1034 (qi96). See note, 77 A.L.R. 21, ii8 (1932). And see Alexander
Lumber Co. v. Aetna Acc. & Liab. Co., 296 Ill. 500, 5o4, 129 N.E. 871, 872 (1921) (bond given
for the protection not only of owner but of materialman, who shall have the right to enforce it).
10 London & Lancashire Lnd. Co. v. State, 153 Md. 308, 138 At. 231 (1927); Wilson v. Whit-
more, 92 Hun 466, 36 N.Y.S. 55o (x895) (bond conditioned on payment for all materials, etc.,
though, apparently, not on doing of the work; held that lack of "privity" was not fatal, the
statute was constitutional, and the materialman should have judgment against the surety),
affd. on opinion below in 157 N.Y. 693, 5i N.E. 1094 (1898); H. H. Robertson Co. v. Globe
Ind. Co., 268 Pa. 309, 112 Atl. 50 (1920) (judgment in favor of the materialman affirmed
without prejudice to rights of the Commonwealth; court said the materialman might have sued
in name of Commonwealth); Commonwealth v. Great American Ind. Co., 312 Pa. 183, 192,
I67 Ad. 793, 797 U933).
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legislature was to provide the person furnishing labor or materials with
a substitute for a lien on the improved property and so put him in a posi-
tion comparable with that which would be his if the property were private
rather than public.21 At any rate, the legislature evidently seeks the ulti-
mate payment of such persons, and to vest rights in them is to make their
protection sure, whereas to place rights in the public body would make it
depend on the latter's caprice. In consequence of the manifested intent
of the legislature, rights accrue to the materialman on the surety bond,
although according to the decisions in the particular jurisdiction, in the
absence of such statute, being a third-party-beneficiary, he would have
no redress on the bond at law or in equity22 or would have redress only if
there were "privity" between himself and the promisee.2 3
A municipal ordinance has been held to have an effect like that of
a statute. This conclusion presupposes that the municipality had implied
power not only to exact a bond conditioned on the payment of persons
furnishing labor or materials, but also to fix the legal effect of such a pro-
vision. Although the former proposition is sound, the latter seems open
to doubt.2 4
21 Oliver Const. Co. v. Williams, I52 Ark. 414, 238 S.W. 615 (1922); State Bank of Duluth v.
Heney, 40 Minn. 145, 147, 41 N.W. 411, 412 (1889).
Decisions differ on the question whether the bond is to be interpreted as commensurate in
coverage with the lien statute. Typical cases holding that the bond is to be so limited are Wis-
consin Brick Co. v. National Sur. Co., 164 Wis. 585, i6o N.W. io44 (1917) (freight on ma-
terials), and Webb v. Freng, i8i Wis. 39, 194 N.W. 155 (1923) (unconsumed forms and scaf-
folding). Among cases holding that it is not to be so limited are Sherman v. American Sur. Co.,
178 Cal. 286, 173 Pac. 16i (i9i8) (holding that while the word "materials" as used in a lien
statute includes only those things which become component parts of the completed improve-
ment, the same word as used in a statute requiring a surety bond has a much broader meaning
and refers generally to things used up in the doing of the work), and London & Lancashire Ind.
Co. v. State, 153 Md. 308, 138 At. 231 (1927).
Compare the situations presented in E. I. Dupont DeNemours Co. v. Culgin-Pace Co., 2o6
Mass. 585, 92 N.E. 1023 (igio), and Kennedy v. Commonwealth, z82 Mass. 480,481, 65 N.E.
828, 829 (19o3), interpreting Mass. Pub. St. x882, c. i6, § 64, and Mass. R. L. 1902, c. 6, § 77,
providing that when public buildings, etc., upon which liens might attach for labor and ma-
terials if they belonged to private persons, are about to be constructed, a bond shall be taken
for payment for all labor furnished and all materials used therein; the bonds were held to cover
only such claims for labor and materials as would have been secured by liens if the property
belonged to a private person. But see Nash v. Commonwealth, 182 Mass. 12, 17, 64 N.E. 690,
691 (1902).
G. H. sampson Co. v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 326, 88 N.E. 911 (igog) (relief in
equity); Otis Elev. Co. v. Long, 238 Mass. 257, 23o N.E. 265 (1921). Cf. Nash v. Common-
wealth, 174 Mass. 335, 337, 54 N.E. 865, 866 (1899), I82 Mass. 12,64 N.E. 69o (i902). See also
H. H. Robertson Co. v. Globe Ind. Co., 268 Pa. 309, 112 Atl. 50 (1920).
2 Wilson v. Whitmore, 92 Hun 466, 36 N.Y.S. 550 (1895), affd. in r57 N.Y. 693, 5r N.E.
1094 (x898).
24 Nevertheless, in Greene County v. Southern Sur. Co., 292 Pa. 304, 317, 141 AUt. 27, 32
(1928), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained the protection of materialmen in such
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Nor does the fact that the materialman is given a lien on the "fund,"
that is, on the right of the contractor against the owner for payment of
the contract price, lead to a different interpretation of the bond or
statute ;25 the condition cannot be referred to the protection of the owner,
for the lien rests on a chose in action belonging to the contractor rather
than on property of the owner; nor does the lien render a right against
the surety superfluous, for the fund may be insufficient.
In cases of this third type subcontractors have been held to lie within
the favor of a bond protecting persons furnishing labor or materials.21
Furthermore, persons furnishing labor or materials to subcontractors have
been given recovery on the contractor's bond, and soundly so when the
bond and statute are broadly worded, for example, conditioned on the
payment of all persons furnishing labor or material for use in the work.2 7
cases as Philadelphia v. Stewart, I95 Pa. 309, 315, 45 At. io56, IO93 (9oo), Philadelphia v.
Stewart, 198 Pa. 422, 48 At. 275 (igoi), and Philadelphia v. Pierson, 217 Pa. 193, 66 Ad. 321
(1907), on the theory that the municipality had implied power to place rights in the material-
men, although the court conceived that by the common law of Pennsylvania donee-beneficiaries
were generally denied recovery. Fortunately, in view of more recent decisions in that state,
Concrete Products Co. v. United States F. & G. Co., 310 Pa. r58, 165 AU. 492 (1933), and
Commonwealth v. Great American Ind. Co., 312 Pa. 183, 190, 201, 167 AU. 793, 796, 800
(1933) (alternative decision), the first mentioned decisions may be, and preferably should be,
placed on the ground that materialmen have rights on the bond at common law as donee-
beneficiaries. And see Copeland's Estate, 313 Pa. 25, i69 At. 367 (i933).
In Concrete Products Co. v. United States F. & G. Co., supra, judgment was given for a
materiahman against the surety company on a bond conditioned on payment of materialmen
and stating that the undertaking should be for their benefit as well as for the benefit of the
promisee; the bond was not given in pursuance of statute or ordinance; apparently, the court
rested the decision on the ground that the materialiman was a donee-beneficiary and would
have explained Greene County v. Southern Surety Co. by the absence of any intention in that
case that materialmen should have rights on the bond.
In Commonwealth v. Great American Ind. Co., supra, it was held that a materialman who
brought an action in the name of the Commonwealth was entitled to recover as a donee-bene-
ficiary irrespective of any statute or ordinance, Kephart, J., recognizing that the position taken
by the court in the former case of Greene County v. Southern Surety Co. in respect to donee-
beneficiaries was being overruled.
2s Wilson v. Whitmor, 92 Hun 466, 36 N.Y.S. 550 (1895), affd. in x57 N.Y. 693, 51 N.E.
1094 (1898).
This conclusion is even dearer when the statute provides that the bond or a part thereof
shall inure to the benefit of the materialman, and that he may sue accordingly. Hunter Ma-
chinery Co. v. Southern Sur. Co., 193 Wis. 218, 2I4 N.W. 613 (1927).
26 State v. Lund, 8o Ind. App. 349, 357, 139 N.E. 466, 468 (1923) (all debts due from the
contractor, including those for labor, materials and board; held this enumeration not ex-
clusive).
27 Oliver Const. Co. v. Williams, 152 Ark. 414, 238 S.W. 615 (1922) (contractor held liable
to sub-subcontractor); Associated Oil Co. v. Commary-Peterson Co., Inc., 32 Cal. App. 582,
163 Pac. 702 (917) (contractor and his surety held liable to person furnishing supplies to
sub-contractor on bond conditioned on payment for labor, materials, and supplies). See
note 13, supra.
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It is to be observed that the statute is an important factor in the in-
terpretation of a bond, especially if the statute be referred to therein.
Thus, if a statute requires the taking of a bond securing payment of claims
for labor and materials and the bond given refers to the statute and obli-
gates the contractor and surety to repay to the municipalityany sum which
it should have to pay to persons furnishing labor or materials, it is proper-
ly interpreted as creating rights in such persons; in this way the legis-
lative purpose is accomplished and a meaningless interpretation of the
bond avoided.2 8 Likewise a bond conditioned on the payment of "all in-
debtedness incurred by the contractor for labor or material" and given, as
the contract states, in pursuance of a statute which directs the taking of
a bond conditioned on the payment "of all indebtedness incurred for labor
or material," is properly held to cover indebtedness for labor or material
incurred by a subcontractor.2 9 Of course, if one accepts the rather extreme
doctrine that a bond executed in attempted compliance with statute is
attended with the same legal consequence as if the statutory requirements
were incorporated therein, no difficulty will be encountered in reaching the
same result.30
In the three classes of cases considered in this sub-topic the practice
varies as to the name in which the materiaiman should sue. In many
states he may sue in his own name, if there is statutory authority or no
statutory prohibition. 3' In other states, in pursuance of statutory direc-
tion, the action is brought in the name of the state, on the relation of the
materialman3 2 or for his use. 33 The mere fact that the municipality is
28 E. I. Dupont DeNemours Powder Co. v. Culgin-Pace Contracting Co., 2o6 Mass. 585,
92 N.E. X023 (IgIO) (Mass. Acts of 1904, C. 349).
29 Griffith v. Stucker, 91 Kan. 47, 50, 136 Pac. 937, 938 (1913) (Kan. Laws of 1887, c. 179).
And see Oliver Const. Co. v. Dancy, 137 Miss. 474, 499, 102 So. 568, 570 (1925) (bond not
stated to be given in compliance with the statute).
30 Williamson v. Williams, 262 Mich. 401, 247 N.W. 704, 89 A.L.R. 442 (1933). See exten-
sive note on the general question in 89 A.L.R. 446 (1934).
31 Philip Carey Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 201 Iowa io63, 206 N.W. 8o8, 47 A.L.R. 495
(1926); West v. Detroit Fid. & Sur. Co., ii8 Neb. 544, 225 N.W. 673 (1929) (materialman may
sue in his own name on bond); Webb v. Freng, 181 Wis. 39, 194 N.W. i55 (1923).
In some states the materialman runs afoul of a common law rule that only the promisee in
an instrument under seal may maintain an action thereon. Even so, the materialman may sue
in the name of the promisee, and recover substantial damages, although, theoretically, a suit in
equity is indicated. L. Hand, J., in Maryland Cas. Co. v. Portland Const. Co., 71 F. (2d) 658,
66o (C.C.A. 2d 1934); I Williston, Contracts §§ 357, 358 (1920).
2Dewey v. State, ex rd. McCollum, 91 Ind. 173 (1883); Kansas v. United States F. & G.
Co., 322 Mo. 121, 135, 136, 14 S.W. (2d) 576, 582 (1929) (Kansas statute provided that one
furnishing material for public construction in Kansas might bring action; Missouri statute that
such person should sue in the name of the state).
33 United States, for the use of Hill v. American Sur. Co., 200 U.S. 197, 26 S. Ct. 168, 50
L. Ed. 437 (19o6) (28 Stat. 278, c. 280 (1894); 40 U.S.C.A. § 270 (1928)); Mankin v. United
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named as promissee when the statute requires the bond to run to the state
is not fatal.34
B. BONDS GIVEN IN COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTE WHEN THE PROPERTY IS OF
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND SUBJECT TO LIEN
Bonds given under such circumstances and conditioned, directly or by
reference to the contract, on the payment of persons furnishing labor or
materials cannot be interpreted apart from the liens of various kinds
frequently given by statute to such persons. If the lien is given and the
surety bond required by the same statute, the two provisions must be
interpreted as a whole; and, even if the provisions are independently en-
acted, the earlier legislation is a circumstance throwing light on the proper
interpretation of the later. Several typical situations demand special at-
tention.
(I) In some states legislation has provided that the owner might exempt
his property from liens in favor of persons furnishing labor or materials
by procuring from the contractor a surety bond conditioned on the pay-
ment of such persons. The inference is then almost irresistible that the
legislature intended such persons to have rights on the bond; for the
owner is in no peril of liens; on the other hand, the persons furnishing
labor or materials need protection and must have been intended to have
rights on the bond in lieu of the liens on the property they would other-
wise have had. It is generally held that they have such rights. 35
(2) In other states persons furnishing labor or materials have liens on
the property of the owner for the amount of their respective claims, not-
withstanding the execution of a statutory surety bond conditioned on pay-
ment of their claims. Here also the legislature has clearly intended to give
States, 215 U.S. 533, 30 S. Ct. 174, 54 L. Ed. 315 (191) (33 Stat. 8i, C. 778 (195o); 40 U.S.
C.A. § 270 (1928)); Board of Education v. Grant, 107 Mich. 151, 64N.W. 1050 (1895) (2 How.
Stat., § 8411c); Easton School District v. Continental Cas. Co., 304 Pa. 67, i55 At. 93 (1931).
In State Bank of Duluth v. Heney, 4o Minn. 145,41 N.W. 411 (z889), it was held that the
specification of a certain remedy, that is, an action in the name of the public body for the use
of the materialman, was exclusive.
34 Board of Education v. Grant, 107 Mich. i5r, 64 N.W. xo5o (I895).
3s Stewart-McGehee Const. Co. v. Brewster, 171 Ark. 197, 284 S.W. 53 (1926) (see C. & M.
Digest, Ark., §§ 69o6, 6912 (1921)) (dictum); Mansfield Lumber Co. v. National Sur. Co., 176
Ark. 1035, 5 S.W. (2d) 294 (1928) (arguendo); Steffes v. Lemke, 40 Minn. 27, 4z N.W. 302
(1889); Bums v. Maltby, 43 Minn. i6r, 45 N.W. 3 (i8go). See Kansas Gen. Stats. igog,
§ 6255.
Of course, if the owner, in accordance with statute (e.g., Cahill's Cons. Laws of N.Y. 1930,
c. 34, § ig), gives bond with surety for the purpose of discharging a mechanic's lien already
filed, although the bond runs to a public officer, an action may be brought thereon by the
lienor. Pierce Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, ii8 App. Div. 662, 1o3 N.Y.S. 678 (1907).
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such persons rights on the surety bond.36 It is true that under this inter-
pretation they receive cumulative protection, but there are situations,
although they are rare, in which a lien on the property would not suffice.
Furthermore, the legislature could have perceived no need of requiring
the owner to take a bond solely for his own indemnity, inasmuch as his
self-interest would suffice to that end.
(3) The third class of cases resembles the second except that under the
lien statute the aggregate of liens on the property of the owner is limited
to the amount due from him to the contractor. Here it is all the more
apparent, in view of the greater need, that the legislature intends tovest
rights in the persons furnishing labor or materials37
(4) In California the Code of Civil Procedure38 provides in effect that
persons furnishing labor, materials, or the like, shall have liens for the
value thereof on the property of the owner, but if a bond be taken condi-
tioned for payment of such persons and by its terms inuring to their bene-
fit and giving them rights of action thereon (either in a suit for foreclosure
of the lien or in separate suits), and the contract and bond be duly filed
for record, then the aggregate recovery under such liens shall be restricted
to the amount found to be due from the owner to the contractor and judg-
ment shall be rendered on the bond for the deficiency. This statute has
been held to be constitutional, 39 and the bonds taken and filed thereunder
are allowed their full statutory and common law effect. Thus, while a
deficiency judgment in favor of a person furnishing labor or materials
against the surety is proper, 40 a direct judgment by the former against
the latter for the full amount of his claim in accordance with the terms
of the bond has been sustained, 4r and it is held to be unnecessary that a
materialman file claim of lien,42 or that any amount be due from owner to
contractor. 43 Furthermore, when the required bond is taken but not filed
(so that the lien of each materialman is for the full amount of his claim),
the statute being constitutional, full effect is given to the unfiled bond
36 Mansfield Lumber Co. v. National Surety Co., r76 Ark. io35, 5 S.W. (2d) 294 (1928) (see
C. & M. Digest, Ark., §§ 69i, 69z6 (X921)); Truscon Steel Co. v. B. &. T Const. Co., 17o La.
1083, 129 So. 644 (1930).
37 Standard Asphalt & Rubber Co. v. Texas Bldg. Co., 99 Kan. 567, 162 Pac. 299, L.R.A.
1917C 490 (1917) (see Kan. Gen. Stat. i9og, §§ 6246, 7006).
38 §§ 1183-1203 (1931).
39 Roystone Co. v. Darling, 171 Cal. 526, 154 Pac. i5 (i916).
4o Roystone Co. v. Darling, supra note 39.
4' Purington v. Olsten, 45 Cal. App. 621, i88 Pac. 288 (1920); Roberts v. Security Trust &
Say. Bank, i96 Cal. 557, 238 Pac. 673 (1925).
42 General Electric Co. v. American Bonding Co., i8o Cal. 675, 182 Pac. 444 (1919).
43 Santa Cruz Portland Cement Co. v. Snow Mountain & Co., 96 Cal. App. 615, 62r, 274
Pac. 617, 619 (1929).
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and the materialman is held to have a right thereon for the amount of
his claim.44 Of course, if the benefit of the bond does not inure to the
materialman but is explicitly confined to the owner, the former will have
no rights thereon. 45
Incidentally, if full recovery is had by the materialman from the surety,
it is submitted that the latter is not subrogated to any lien of the former
on the property of the owner, for the bond given to the owner by the
surety fixes the relation between them as that of real surety and personal
principal, respectively.46 It is to be observed that even a failure of the
owner to file the bond merely increased his own risk; it in no way injured
the surety, for his liability would have been just as great if the bond had
been filed. Of course, the surety is subrogated to the right of his principal,
the contractor, to the unpaid contract price, if any, since his payment of
the materialman has freed that fund from the grasp of the owner.
(5) A fifth type of situation is that in which persons furnishing labor
or material are given liens on the fund, that is, on the right of the con-
tractor against the owner for the contract price. Clearly, the intention of
the legislature in requiring a surety bond is that such persons shall have
rights thereon and it is so generally held;47 they may need such protection,
for the fund may be insufficient; and the owner does not, for the lien is
not on his property.
In any of the situations discussed in this sub-topic, the rights on the
bond of the person furnishing labor or material are all the clearer if the
statute places in him a right to receive payment, a right of action, or the
use or benefit of the bond.45
In each of the situations thus far considered in this sub-topic the bond
has been explicitly conditioned on the payment of persons furnishing labor
or materials. The omission of such a condition may be cured by a pro-
vision of the statute that a formal bond securing the doing of the work
44Hammond Lumber Co. v. Willis, 171 Cal. 565, I53 Pac. 947 (1916).
4s Luke v. Southern Sur. Co., io4 Cal. App. 727, 286 Pac. 490 (1930).
46 Thus there is present a relation of subsuretyship, the order of ultimate liability being con-
tractor, surety, and owner.
47 Brink v. Bartlett, io5 La. 336, 339, 29 So. 958, 960 (igoi) (La. Stat. no. i8o of x894; La.
Rev. Stat. 1884, §§ 2879, 2883); United States F. & G. Co. v. Parsons, 147 Miss. 335, 362, 112
So. 469, 475 (1927) (see Hemenway's Miss. Code 1917, 1921, §§ 2434, 2434b; Miss. Ann. Code
1930, §§ 2274-2276); Hartford Acc. & imd. Co. v. Natchez Inv. Co., Inc., i6 Miss. i98, 222,
132 So. 535, 135 id. 497 (193). In the Natchez Company case the court said that the giving of
the bond "displaced" the lien on the fund, evidently meaning only that the lien was no longer
entitled to the priority over assignments assured to it by § 2275.
4g Stewart-McGehee Const. Co. v. Brewster, 17z Ark. 197, 284 S.W. 53 (1926) (C. & M.
Digest, Ark., § 6912 (I92I)) (dictum); Standard Asphalt & Rubber Co. v. Texas Bldg. Co., 99
Kan. 567, 162 Pac. 299, L.R.A. 1917C 490 (1917) (Kan. Gen. Stat. 1909, § 7007); Brink v.
Bartlett, io5 La. 336, 29 So. 958 (1901).
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shall also contain an obligation for the payment of persons furnishing
labor or materials and, in the absence thereof, shall inure to their benefit
in the same manner as if the obligation were included therein. Such a
statute has been held not to violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution and to vest rights in the persons furnishing labor
and materials, 49 even though the bond purports to confine rights to the
owner.5 °
C. BONDS GIVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF STATUTORY REQUIREMENT WHEN THE
PROPERTY IS OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OR OTHERWISE FREE FROM LIEN
In situations to be discussed in this sub-topic and the following one the
treatment differs much from that of the two preceding sub-topics. Though
there is no statute requiring him to do so, the owner in entering into a
contract with the principal for the doing of a work of construction,
maintenance, or the like, takes from the latter a surety bond condi-
tioned, directly or by reference to the contract, on the payment of persons
furnishing labor or materials;sI furthermore, the owner is under no lia-
bility to the materialman,5 2 that is, the owner is not personally respon-
sible, nor is the property of the owner subject to lien, for the payment of
his claim; s3 obviously, the most frequent instance is where the owner is
the United States, a state, a municipality, or other public body, and the
property on which the work is done is in public use. 4 Now, in requiring
a bond of such form the public body or other owner may be actuated by
various motives, selfish or unselfish. It is obvious that its interests will
be best served if persons furnishing labor and materials are given redress
against the surety. A prospective bidder of limited means is assured of
49 United States F. & G. Co. v. Parsons, 147 Miss. 335, 362, 112 So. 469, 475, 53 A.L.R. 88,
96 (1927) (statute also gave persons furnishing labor or materials the right to intervene in an
action subject to the owner's priority of claim).
so Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. v. Natchez Inv. Co., Inc., i6i Miss. 198, 222, 132 So. 535, 135
id. 497 (193').
s, The same reasoning applies to situations in which the bond is conditioned, expressly or
impliedly, on the payment of subcontractors, or persons furnishing supplies, machinery, funds,
or other aids to the work.
s2 Throughout this sub-topic statements concerning the materialman are equally applicable
to persons furnishing labor, and if the coverage of the bond is broad enough, to persons furnish-
ing supplies, machinery, loans, and the like.
s3 A case of private construction in which the owner is not subject to liability, real or per-
sonal, is found in Adirondack Core & Plug Co. v. N.Y.C.R.R. Co., 238 App. Div. 346, 264
N.Y.S. 484 (i933), infra note 65.
S4 Another such case is French v. Farmer, 178 Cal. 218, 172 Pac. 1102 (iqI8), in which the
construction was being done for a railroad company on land of the United States government.
For treatment of the implied exclusion of public property in public use from the oppration
of statutes providing for mechanics' liens, see Hutchinson v. Krueger, 34 Okla. 23, 25, 124 Pac.
591, 592 (1912); see notes, Ann. Cas. 1914 Cio3; M4. x9 13A 762; 35 L.R.A. I4I; 2o L.R.A.
(N.S.) 261; 41 id. 315.
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ample credit and placed more nearly on an even footing with other bidders,
and thus a larger field of bidders is likely; and even after the contract is
let it is to the advantage of the owner to have suitable materials supplied
cheaply and quickly to the contractor.55 While it is true that the cost of
a surety company's bond will be reflected in an increase of the contract
price, the advantages stated are well worth it. Furthermore, especially if
the owner is a public body, recognition may well have been given to the
general, economic importance of having the claims of persons furnishing
labor and materials satisfied; and at all events a certain peace of mind
arises from the contemplation that the components of an improvement
have not been furnished at the expense of others. True enough, it is not
to motive, but to intention, that the law attaches its consequences.
Nevertheless, motive is important in ascertaining intention; that is, it is
a circumstance which aids interpretation. Here it is dearly the normal
intention of owner, contractor, and surety, not merely that performance
shall run to the materialman, but that he shall have a right on the surety
bond which will enable him to enforce performance. Consequently, courts
may well recognize a strong inference of fact or even a prima facie legal
presumption to that effect. Moreover, the legal consequences of a con-
trary interpretation would fall short of the evident purposes of the bond;
for then the public body or other owner alone would have a right on the
bond and any action at law that it could maintain (based on non-payment
of the materialman) would be merely for nominal damages;s6 and, while
it is conceivable that equity might grant specific performance at its suit,
even so the burden of such litigation would fall on it rather than on the
materialman, who is the beneficiary of the relief sought.
It being the intention of the parties to clothe the materialman with
appropriate rights on the bond, the law should and generally does give
effect to that intention,s7 notwithstanding that he is not a promisee, does
ss Such a provision "enables one with small means and limited credit to compete with those
more advantageously circumstanced. The city is thus enabled to secure greater competition
in bidding and to obtain better execution of the work on lower terms." Macfarlane, J., in
City of St. Louis v. Von Phul, 133 Mo. 56i, 568, 34 S.W. 843, 845, 54 Am. St. Rep. 695, 698
(i896).
s6 Unless the bond provides that the owner may include the materialman's claim as an ele-
ment of damage. New York Filtration Co. v. City of Kenosha, 167 Wis. 371, 167 N.W. 451
(1918).
s7 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Portland Const. Co., 71 F. (2d) 658 (C.C.A. 2d 1934); National Sur.
Co. v. Hall-Miller Decorating Co., io4 Miss. 626, 61 So. 700, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 325 (1913);
Southwestern Portland Cement Co. v. Williams, 32 N.M. 68, 25r Pac. 380, 49 A.L.R. 525
(1926), Campbell's Cases on Suretyship 13 (1931); N. 0. Nelson Co. v. Stephenson, 168 S.W.
6i (Tex. Civ. App. i914); Builders Lumber & Supply Co. v. Chicago Bonding & Sur. Co., 167
Wis. .67, 166 N.W. 320 (z918). Contra: Miller v. Bonner, i63La. 33Q, III So. 776 (1927). See
cases cited passin, and 49 A.L.R. 534 (1927).
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not give consideration, is not "in privity" with the promisee, 8 and fur-
nishes the materials without knowledge of or reliance on the bond.59 In
thus vesting rights in materialmen, the law is merely applying its principle
of protecting third-person-beneficiaries. 6° It would hardly be correct to
regard the materialmen as creditor-beneficiaries since they have no rights
against the promisee (the public body) or in its property. They more
nearly resemble donee-beneficiaries,6' since the public body which exacts
the promise is under no liability to the materialmen for the performance
promised.
It is to be observed, however, that the usual inference or presumption
arising from the expression of an undertaking or condition to pay material-
men may be rebutted. Such is generally the effect of a provision in the
bond that substantive or procedural rights thereon, or the use of benefit
thereof, shall accrue to no person other than the owner. The undertaking
or condition to pay materialmen must then be referred to an intention to
create rights in the owner alone. This result is dearly justified in those
cases of private construction where the owner's property may be sub-
jected to lien; for the condition to pay makes for the indemnification of
the owner. Moreover, even in cases of public or other construction where
the owner is under no risk of lien or other liability, the condition to pay
will not be in vain, for the owner will have a right of specific performance
which he may exercise if he continues in the mood of protecting material-
men. 6
The authority of a public body and its officers to exact a bond condi-
tioned on the payment of materialmen should not be open to doubt. The
reasons heretofore given for inferring or presuming an intention in the
public body (or its officers) to protect materialmen are equally indicative
of an implied authority conferred by the legislature on the public body
and officers to accomplish that desirable result, whether the legislature
expressly requires or authorizes the giving of a bond (though without
58 On principle, "privity" is not necessary. Some courts, thinking otherwise, have found it
in the reasons stated supra for presuming intention. City of St. Louis v. Von Phul, 133 Mo.
561, 572, 34 S.W. 843, 846, 54 Am. St. Rep. 695, 701 (1896), overruling Kansas City &c. Co. v.
Thompson, 120 Mo. 218, 25 S.W. 522 (1894).
59 Baker & Co. v. Bryan, 64 Iowa 56I, 566, 21 N.W. 83, 85 (I884); United States Gypsum
Co. v. Gleason, 135 Wis. 539, 116 N.W. 238, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 906 (i9o8).
60 This principle is of general reception in most of the American states. i Wiliston, Con-
tracts §§ 347-403 (1920); Restatement, Contracts, §§ 133-147 (1932).
61 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Portland Const. Co., 71 F. (2d) 658 (C.C.A. 2d 1934).
62 Contra: Hipwell v. National Sur. Co., 130 Iowa 656, 661, xo5 N.W. 318, 320 (19o6)
(contract containing agreement to pay for labor and materials and to save the city harmless;
bond conditioned on full performance of contract, but with proviso that no person whose name
was undisclosed should have any share or benefit therein).
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stipulating that it contain a provision for the protection of persons fur-
nishing labor and materials),6 3 or not.6 4
In New York and Pennsylvania6s the fact that materialmen might be
thrown into competition with the public owner in the distribution of the
penal sum of the bond has been held to indicate an intention of the parties
to the bond that no rights should arise in the materialmen, since doubtless
the dominant purpose of the bond is the protection of the owner.66 The
inquiry then naturally arises whether in these two states the public owner
has any redress on the surety bond because of the contractor's failure to
make payment to materialmen. Obviously it has not suffered substantial
damage, for it has not paid the materialmen, 67 and it is not even under
liability to the materialmen, real or personal. Nor does it help that in
63 Baker & Co. v. Bryan, 64 Iowa 561, 565, 21 N.W. 83, 84 (x884); City of St. Louis v. Von
Phul, 133 Mo. 56r, 567, 34 S.W. 843, 844, 54 Am. St. Rep. 695, 697 (1896), overruling Kansas
City & Co. v. Thompson, 120 Mo. 218, 25 S.W. 522 (1894), and distinguishing Howsmon v.
Trenton Water Co., i19 Mo. 304, 24 S.W. 784 (1893) (citizen whose property was burned
denied an action on contract of water company).
64 National Sur. Co. v. Hall-Miller Decorating Co., 1o4 Miss. 626, 6i So. 700, 46 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 325 (1913); Doll v. Crume, 41 Neb. 655, 59 N.W. 8o6 (1894); N. 0. Nelson Co. v. Steph-
enson, 168 S.W. 61 (Tex. Civ. App. r914); United States Gypsum Co. v. Gleason, r35 Wis.
539, ii6 N.W. 238, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 9o6 (igo8).
65 Fosmire v. National Sur. Co., 229 N.Y. 44, 127 N.E. 472 (1920); Van Clief & Sons, Inc. v.
City of New York, 141 Misc. 216, 252 N.Y.S. 402 (1931) (provision to pay materialmen as-
cribed to desire to avoid inconvenience to owner arising from statutory liens on fund); Adiron-
dack Core & Plug Co. v. N.Y.C.R.R. Co., 238 App. Div. 346, 264 N.Y.S. 484 (1933) (reversing
144 Misc. 558, 258 N.Y.S. 916 (1932); private construction but owner's property not subject
to lien; rested on Fosmire case); City of Lancaster v. Frescoln, 192 Pa. 452, 43 At. 96i (1899),
203 Pa. 64o , 53 At. 508 (1902); Greene County v. Southern Sur. Co., 292 Pa. 304, 308, 141
At. 27, 29 (1927), approved as to this point in Concrete Products Co. v. United States F. & G.
Co., 310 Pa. i58, i65, I65 Ad. 492, 495 (1933); Patterson v. New Eagle Borough, 294 Pa. 4o,
405, 144 Ad. 423, 424 (1928) (even though the bond referred to a statute which required a bond
protecting persons furnishing labor or materials in other kinds of construction); Pittsburgh v.
Bucanelly Const. Co., 300 Pa. 27, i5o At. 1oo (1930) (like Patterson case).
66 It is to be observed that this competition might arise through the materialman's recover-
ing on the bond before default in the completion of the work, or through both owner and ma-
terialman claiming recovery, one on the ground of non-completion and the other on that of
nonpayment.
Perhaps the Fosmire and Van Chef cases can be rested on the ground that a statute or ordi-
nance required the taking of a bond conditioned on performance of the work, and hence im-
pliedly forbade any competing protection. But see Southwestern Portland Cement Co. v .
Williams, 32 N.M. 68, 251 Pac. 380, 49 A.L.R. 525 (1926).
Of course, if a statute requires the taking of a bond conditioned on both performance of the
work and payment of materialmen, there is little difficulty in interpreting the bond as vesting
rights in materialmen as well as in the owner and giving legal effect to that interpretation.
Commonwealth v. Great American Ind. Co., 312 Pa. 183, 192, 167 At. 793, 797 (i933).
67 And if it had, the payment would not have been the proximate consequence of the breach,
since the public owner was under no liability.
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some instances the fund, that is, the contract price owing from owner to
contractor, is subject to statutory liens, for the fund is the property of
the contractor." Nevertheless, the very inadequacy of the legal remedy
affords good reason for specific performance in equity at the suit of the
public owner: the decree should require that the surety pay the material-
men and so perform the condition or obligation of the bond.69
In most states the power and incentive of the owner to fix a limit of
liability amply large to cover both species of default are explicitly or
tacitly regarded as refuting any intention on the part of owner or of
legislature that the owner should have the only or even the superior right
arising on the bond.70
Obviously, if separate bonds be given, one conditioned on the perform-
ance of the work and the other on payment of claims of persons furnishing
labor or materials, any difficulty with respect to intention which would
arise from the danger of competition is not present, and legal effect should
be, and generally is, given to the intention that the materialmen should
68 Village of Argyle v. Plunkett, 226 N.Y. 306, 3ii, 124 N.E. i, 3 (igig).
69 In Johnson Service Co., Inc., v. Monin, Inc., 253 N.Y. 417,421, 422, 171 N.E. 692, 693
(1930), which was an action brought by a materialman against the surety company, the city
joined in the prayer that the surety be made to pay in accordance with its promise, and it was
held that the surety should make payment either to the city in trust for the materialman or
directly to the latter. And see Wilson v. Moon, 240 App. Div. 440, 442, 270 N.Y.S. 859, 862
(i934). The theory of trust may be open to question since the same reasoning employed
by the New York courts to deny a direct legal right to the materialman would militate against
giving him a right as cestui que trust. The preferable theory is that of specific performance;
being available for the benefit of an ordinary donee-beneficiary, it should be here. Croker v.
New York Trust Co., 245 N.Y. 17, I9, 156 N.E. 8i, 82 (1927).
Bonds Given in New York to Discharge a Mechanic's Lien. The bonds discussed in this sub-
topic are to be sharply distinguished from those given under the provisions of Cahill's Consol.
Laws of N.Y. 1930, c. 34, §§ 5, 21, 23, to discharge a lien acquired by a person furnishing labor
or materials to a contractor or subcontractor in the course of public construction. Such a per-
son may acquire a lien upon the money of the state or municipality applicable to such construc-
tion to the extent of the amount due or to become due on the principal contract. This lien may
be discharged by the contractor's or subcontractor's entering into an undertaking with surety
conditioned on payment of such judgment as may be recovered in an action to enforce the lien.
In a suit on the surety bond, the validity, priority, and extent of the lien are of paramount im-
portance. Pertinent cases are American Radiator Co. v. City of New York, 223 N.Y. 193, 119
N.E. 391 (1918); Schuessler v. Mack, 240 App. Div. 449, 270 N.Y.S. 287 (I934); and Border v.
Frank G. Cook & Sons, Inc., 240 App. Div. 476, 270 N.Y.S. 229 (1934).
70 Authorities cited passim.
Some cases stress the power of supervision over the work residing in the public owner; but
this power affects the quality of the work, and not economy in purchase and use of labor and
materials. See Southwestern Portland Cement Co. v. Williams, 32 N.M. 68, 77, 251 Pac. 380,
383, 49 A.L.R. 525, 532 (1926), Campbell's Cases on Suretyship, 13, 17 (1931).
This matter is also treated infra, sub-topic Ill-A. (This sub-topic will be published in the
second part of this article, in the February number of the REvIEw.)
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have rights.71 For similar reasons a like conclusion is reached in Pennsyl-
vania when a single bond is given for both purposes but priority of the
claim of the municipality provided for therein.72
Furthermore, although the bond is dual in scope, if it directly or by
reference to the contract manifests an intention to place in the material
man a substantive right to receive payment, 73 or a right of action (which
presupposes such a substantive right), or the use or benefit thereof, then
the only real question is whether legal effect shall be given to the inten-
tion so manifested, and the foregoing comments concerning authority of
the public body and its officers and the necessity of privity between owner
and materialman become pertinent. Most authorities soundly recognize
the presence of rights in the materialman. 74 It seems to be the present
7' Philadelphia v. Stewart, 195 Pa. 309, 315, 45 At. zo56 (igoo); Philadelphia v. Stewart,
z98 Pa. 422, 48 At. 275 (i9o) (holding that the judgment recovered by a materialman against
the city in the former action was no bar to a like action prosecuted by this materialman); Phila-
delphia v. Pierson, 217 Pa. 193, 66 At. 321 (19o7); Philadelphia v. Jafolla, 311 Pa. 575, 167
AUt. 569 (1933).
The cases just cited were explained by Kephart, J., in Greene County v. Southern Sur. Co.,
292 Pa. 304, 317, 141 At. 27, 32 (1928), on the ground that the bonds were executed in pursu-
ance of an ordinance of the city and that the city had implied authority by ordinance not only
to require the execution of a bond protecting persons furnishing labor and materials but also to
create rights in their favor in derogation of the common law. Since the more recent decisions
of Concrete Products Co. v. United States F. & G. Co., 3io Pa. z58, r65 At. 492 (1933), and
Commonwealth v. Great American Ind. Co., 312 Pa. x83, 189, 190, 201, 167 Ad. 793, 796, 8oo
(1933) (alternative decision), the first mentioned cases may and preferably should be rested on
the ground that rights will be created in donee-beneficiaries at common law.
The like result would probably be reached by the courts of New York under more recent
views as to what constitutes "privity." See Maltby & Sons Co. v. Wade, 131 Misc. 143, 227
N.Y.S. 9o (1928), affd. in 224 App. Div. 779, 230 N.Y.S. 839 (1928).
72 Portland Sand & Gravel Co. v. Globe Ind. Co., 301 Pa. 132, 138, 151 At. 687, 689 (1930)
(bond was also given for the use and suit of materialmen).
73 As in Union Sheet Metal Works v. Dodge, 129 Cal. 390, 393, 62 Pac. 41, 42 (19oo) ("hold
ourselves responsible to" materialmen).
74 Union Sheet Metal Works v. Dodge, 129 Cal. 390, 394, 62 Pac. 41, 42 (I9oo); City of
St. Louis v. Von Phul, 133 Mo. 561, 34 S.W. 843, 54 Am. St. Rep. 695 (I896) (bond given pro-
viding that materialmen might sue in the name of the owner), overruling Kansas City Co. v.
Thompson, 120 Mo. 218, 25 S.W. 522 (1894); School District of Kansas City v. Livers, 147 Mo.
58o, 49 S.W. 507 (I899) (like facts); St. Louis v. Parker-Washington Co., 271 Mo. 229, 243,
196 S.W. 767, 771 (1917), cert. denied in 245 U.S. 651, 38 S. Ct. 11, 62 L. Ed. 531 (1917); C. A.
Burton Machinery Co. v. National Sur. Co., 182 S.W. 8o1, 803 (Mo. App. i916); Zipp v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co., 73 App. Div. 20, 76 N.Y.S. 386 (1902); Maltby & Sons Co. v. Wade,
131 Misc. 143, 227 N.Y.S. 90 (1928) (relying on Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233, 237, 12o N.E.
639, 640 (i9r8)), affd. without opinion in 224 App. Div. 779, 230 N.Y.S. 839 (1928), and ex-
pressly disapproving the contrary decision of Lyth v. Hingston, 14 App. Div. i, 43 N.Y.S.
653 (1897) (alternative decision); Newark Concrete Pipe Co. v. National Sur. Co., 131 Misc.
718, 228 N.Y.S. 569 (1928); Crudup v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 56 Okla. 786, 156 Pac.
899 (i916); Portland Sand & Gravel Co. v. Globe Ind. Co., 301 Pa. 132, 151 At. 687 (1930)
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attitude of the courts of New York that a bond of this form imports an
intention that the materialman should have a right thereon, but junior
in rank to that of the owner, and that legal effect should be given to that
intention; the result is that the materialman may sue on the bond if the
owner has received substantial performance or other satisfaction75 but
not otherwise76
A right in a materialman has been recognized even though the condi-
tion of the bond to pay persons having claims for labor and materials is
accompanied by a more specific provision that it is for the use and suit
of persons having liens therefor, and such liens cannot be had; this con-
clusion is fortified when a statute requires a bond to be conditioned as
stated.77
In certain cases the surety bond contains promises running directly
to persons furnishing labor or material as well as to the owner; it is then
properly and generally held that such persons have rights on the bond.78
The promises running to them may be interpreted as offers which, if not
revoked, will be accepted by the furnishing of labor or materials in reli-
ance on them. Rights would then arise irrespective of any rule favoring
third-party-beneficiaries. Nevertheless, persons furnishing labor or ma-
terials are not confined to this theory of recovery; they would better
claim as third-party-beneficiaries under the promises made to the owner
not only to do the work but to pay laborers and materialmen; it is in-
tended that they shall have rights thereon and the law gives effect to that
(bond ran to the use of materialmen and gave them the right to sue); Texas Fid. & Bonding Co.
v. Rosenberg Ind. School District, i95 S.W. 298 (Tex. Civ. App. x917).
Moreover, in the Missouri cases cited supra it was held that the action might be maintained
in the name of the owner for the use of the materialman because the bond so provided.
75 Maltby & Sons Co. v. Wade, i31 Misc. 143, 227 N.Y.S. go (1928), affd. without opinion
in 224 App. Div. 779, 23o N.Y.S. 839 (1928).
,6 Eddy, Inc., v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 265 N.Y. 276, 279, 192 N.E. 410, 411 (I934).
Buffalo Cement Co. v. McNaughton, go Hun 74, 79, 35 N.Y.S. 453, 456 (i895), affd. on the
opinion below in 156 N.Y. 702, 5i N.E. io89 (1898). But see Zipp v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,
73 App. Div. 20, 76 N.Y.S. 386 (1902) and Newark Concrete Pipe Co. v. National Sur. Co.,
131 Misc. 718, 228 N.Y.S. 569 (1928), in which cases performance of the contract with the
city did not appear.
In the Eddy case, a city ordinance provided that no recovery should be had on the bond
unless notice be first given to the city, and it was held that judgment should not have been
rendered until the city had been given the chance of a hearing, in which it might protect its
interest or that of some other materialman.
77 Sub-topic lI-E, note 56. (This sub-topic will be published in the second part of this
article in the February number of the-REvrEw.)
78 People's Lumber Co. v. Gillard, 136 Cal. 55, 68 Pac. 576 (I9o2); Williams v. Tingey, 26
Cal. App. 574, 147 Pac. 584 (1905); Panama Commercial Co. v. Tingey, 26 Cal. App. 576, 147
Pac. 585 (Igx5).
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intention irrespective of the direct undertakings; thus reliance is unneces-
sary 79 and revocation is ineffective.
Of course, the inference or presumption of intention to create a legal
right in the materialnan is not rebutted by the fact that the bond is also
conditioned on saving the public body harmless from any default on the
part of the contractor or by the fact that the contract provides that it
shall or may withhold payment until claims for labor or materials are
satisfied and evidence thereof produced.8°
Frequently, the terms of bonds given in connection with public con-
struction (although in the absence of any statutory requirement), are
sufficiently broad to cover materials furnished to an immediates x or re-
mote82 subcontractor, or to an assignee of the contract, 83 or to a surety of
a subcontractor who has taken over that part of the work after insolvency
of the latter5 4 Furthermore, the expression "persons furnishing labor or
materials" is properly interpreted as including subcontractors.8 s
If, however, the bond in terms protects persons furnishing materials
to the contractor, the writer believes that an interpretation covering ma-
terials furnished to a subcontractor would be unjustified,86 notwith-
standing the decisions relating to bonds for public construction given in
obedience to statute.8
D. BONDS GIVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF STATUTORY REQUIREMENT WHEN THE
PROPERTY IS OF PRIVATE OwNERsH AND SUBJECT TO LIEN
In this sub-topic, as in the last, the absence of statute requires a method
of treatment different from that earlier employed. Here, in taking a bond
79 N. 0. Nelson Co. v. Stephenson, 168 S.W. 6i (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
so Southwestern Portland Cement Co. v. Williams, 32 N.M. 68, 251 Pac. 380, 49 A.L.R.
525 (1926).
sr Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 64 F. (2d) 583 (C.C.A. 4th 1933) ("pay all lawful
claims for labor performed and materials used"); Philadelphia v. H. C. Nichols Co., 214 Pa.
265, 273, 63 Atl. 886, 888 (x9o6) ("all sums of money due for labor or materials furnished or
performed in and about the said work"; alternative decision); Molony & Carter Co. v. Pennell
& Harley, Inc., 169 S.C. 462, 169 S.E. 283 (1933) (bond of contractor, secured by securities
deposited by him with highway department conditioned on payment for all labor, materials
and supplies used in and about the construction); Finch v. Enke, 54 S.D. 164, 222 N.W. 657
(1929) ("all claims incurred for materials, supplies, tools, and appliances, in carrying out the
provisions of said contract").
82 Blair & Franse Const. Co. v. Allen, 251 Ky. 366, 367, 65 S.W. (2d) 78, 79 (1933) (subcon-
tractor of a subcontractor of a subcontractor allowed recovery on bond conditioned for pay-
ment of claims for labor, materials and supplies).
83 Kaufmann v. Cooper, 46 Neb. 644, 65 N.W. 796 (i896) ("all claims for labor or materials
furnished in or about said contract").
'4 Philadelphia v. H. C, Nichols Co., supra note 8i.
85 Habig v. Layne, 38 Neb. 743, 57 N.W. 539 (1894).
"The writer has not encountered authorities one way or the other. 87 Supra note 13.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
conditioned, either directly or by reference to the contract, on the pay-
ment of laborers and materialmen, the owner usually contemplates that
he may incur risk, either by undertaking personal liability to persons
furnishing labor or material, for example, by the execution of a guaranty,
or, as is more frequently the case, through the subjection of his property
to statutory liens in favor of such persons. Hence, not only is the owner
influenced by the same motives as were discussed in the preceding sub-
topic relating to public construction 8 but he also has the powerful in-
centive of procuring protection against his own risk. Here again the ulti-
mate question is one of intention, that is, of interpretation of the trans-
action between owner and surety. They certainly contemplate that the
condition, since it is to pay the materialman,89 will beget performance to
the latter and so be for his benefit; but the decisive question is, what is
their common objective intention as to the creation of rights?9 This ques-
tion must be viewed from the respective standpoints of promisor and
promisee, surety and owner. As far as the owner is concerned, it is dear
that his interests require that he should have a right against the surety
(or the contractor and the surety if both join in the bond) that payment
be made to materialmen; for the owner is under risk, and this is the surest
and most direct way of securing him against threatened or suffered loss.
The more difficult question is whether the owner also contemplates the
creation of rights in the materialmen. If one of his purposes is to serve
them, it will be best effected in this way; if to serve himself by serving
them, that is, by inducing them to furnish labor or materials cheaply
and promptly, and to bring about equality among bidders and so widen
the field of bidding, this purpose will be best accomplished so; and even
if his only incentive is to serve himself, that is, by procuring protection
against his own risk, the presence of rights in the materialmen may induce
the latter to enforce payment and thus relieve the owner, if not from the
circuitous and burdensome process of paying and later suing for reimburse-
ment,9' at least from the vexation and expense of a suit for exoneration or
88 Subtopic I-C, supra. Boulden, J., in Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Rainer, 220 Ala. 262, 267,
125 So. 55, 59, 77 A.L.R. 13, 20 (1929); Wanamaker, J., dissenting in Cleveland Metal Roofing
& Ceiling Co. v. Gaspard, 89 Ohio St. 185, 209, io6 N.E. 9, i-i6 (1g4), L.R.A. i9i5A 768,
778, Ann. Cas. igi6A 745, 753.
89 Of course, what is said in this sub-topic concerning the materialman is equally applicable
to a person furnishing labor, and, if the coverage of the bond be wide enough, to persons fur-
nishing supplies, machinery, funds, and the like.
9o See the illuminating opinion of Maltbie, J., in Byram Lumber & Supply Co. v. Page, lo9
Conn. 256, 261, 146 At. 293, 294 (1929).
91 Knight & Jillson Co. v. Castle, 172 Ind. 97, 104, 87 N.E. 976, 978-979, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.)
57.3, 583 (1909).
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specific performance or an action for damages92 The probable attitude of
the surety (or of contractor and surety, if both execute the bond), remains
to be considered. How will he be affected by undertaking obligations to
materialmen as well as to the owner? Payment made to a materialman by
the surety (or the contractor), before or after judgment, will also consti-
tute performance of his obligation to the owner. Payment to the owner,
however, will not work discharge of an obligation of the surety to the
materialman, unless the owner has already paid the materialman and so
become subrogated to his right; but, although the surety would have to
ascertain at his peril whether the owner had paid the materialman, still
the chance of misrepresentation on the part of the owner is so remote that
this risk is negligible. Suppose, however, that the surety has paid neither
the owner nor the materialman; under the authorities governing analogous
situations, the owner, having come under imminent risk, for example,
through the filing and maturing of a lien on his property, may maintain
an action at law against the surety (or the principal) for the amount of
the lien, even though he has not yet paid the lienor.93 Since the owner will
perhaps not use the money so recovered in satisfying the materialman, it
may be objected that duality of obligation would expose the surety (or
the principal) to the risk of double recovery. The answer is that either
may avert such double recovery by resorting to equity,94 or by appro-
priate proceedings under the codes or the practice acts.95 Hence there
92 Maltbie, J., in Byram Lumber & Supply Co. v. Page, xog Conn. 256, 265, 146 Ati. 293,
295-296 (1929); Boulden, J., in 220 Ala. 262, 267, 125 So. 55, 59, 77 A.L.R. 13, 20 (1929).
The suit would be for exoneration, if the surety be bound to the materialman; so that owner
and surety would stand in the relation of surety and principal, respectively; on principle, for
specific performance, if the surety be not so bound (Ranelaugh v. Hayes, i Vern. 189 (1683)),
but under the authorities for damages (infra note 93).
93 Sedgwick, Damages § 789 (gth ed. 1912). Mr. Sedgwick properly criticizes this result.
At law, the owner would better be confined to an action for nominal damages against the con-
tractor, and also against the surety if the latter is held to be obligated to the materialman; thus
the owner would be driven into equity to file a bill for exoneration. There is a theoretical ob-
jection to recovery of full damages at law, namely, that the owner has not come under sole
liability (so that it is not reasonably certain that he will have to pay in the end), but only
under alternative liability. There is also the practical objection that the principal or surety,
as the case may be, will be subjected to the risk that the owner will not use the money so re-
covered in paying the materialman and thus the contractor or surety be twice compelled to
make compensation.
94 A court of equity, at the suit of contractor or surety, may well enjoin the action of the
owner temporarily, and make the injunction permanent if and when either should pay the
materialman and so exonerate the owner. i Williston on Contracts, § 392 (1920).
9s The materialman could be made a party to the action brought by the owner against the
surety or the principal at the instance of either plaintiff or defendant, and the judgment be
made to contain a provision for its discharge on payment made by surety or principal to the
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seems to be no reason for thinking that either surety'or principal would
be averse to the duality of obligation. In conclusion, it is submitted that
there is at least a strong inference of fact, and probably a prima facie
legal presumption,96 that the owner on the one side and the surety (and
contractor) on the other, have the common, objective intention of vesting
rights in the materialmen as well as in the owner. The inference or pre-
sumption being unrebutted, by the better view and the weight of au-
thority, the materialmen have direct legal rights on the surety bond, 97
although they are not parties thereto, gave no consideration therefor and
materialman. Wilson v. Stilwell, 9 Ohio St. 468,471 (1859). Cf. Rector &c. of Trinity Church
v. Higgins, 48 N.Y. 532, 539 (1872).
These remedies of surety or principal, while guarding the rule of full damages against un-
just consequences, can be logically sustained only on the assumption that the plaintiff has not
suffered substantial damage.
96 Concrete Steel Co. v. Illinois Sur. Co., 163 Wis. 41, 46, 157 N.W. 543, 544 (r916) ("If the
contract be to pay a debt due to a third person, presumably it is for his benefit unless it ap-
pears that the contract was not so intended").
,9 7m. Bayley Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 5o F. (2d) 899 (C.C.A. 5 th, 1931); French v.
Farmer, 178 Cal. 218, 172 Pac. iio2 (i918); Byram Lumber & Supply Co. v. Page, Iog Conn.
256, 146 Ati. 293 (1929); American Sur. Co. v. Smith, ioo Fla. 1012, 130 So. 440 (1930); Knight
& Jillson Co. v. Castle, 172 Ind. 97, 103, 87 N.E. 976, 978, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 573, 582 (go9)
(dic um); Jordan v. Kavanaugh, 63 Ia. 152, i8 N.W. 85I (1884) (bond conditioned on per-
formance of contract which provided that principal should pay persons furnishing labor or ma-
terials, and give bond securing owner against such claims; general statute authorizing suit by
beneficiaries of bonds); Getchell & Martin Lumber Co. v. Peterson & Sampson, x24 Iowa 599,
ioo N.W. 55o (I9O4); Algonite Stone Mfg. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., Ioo Kan. 28, 163 Pac.
1076, L.R.A. I 9 17D 722 (917); Dixon v. Home, i8o N.C. 585, Io5 S.E. 270 (1920); Warren
.Webster & Co. v. Beaumont Hotel Co., 1SI Wis. i, x38 N.W. 102 (X912) (bond conditioned on
principal's paying "all indebtedness"); Concrete Steel Co. v. Illinois Sur. Co., 163 Wis. 41,
157 N.W. 543 (1916) (bond conditioned on principal's satisfying "all claims and demands");
Yawkey-Crowley Lumber Co. v. Sinaiko, 189 Wis. 298, 304, 2o6 N.W. 976, 978 (1926) (owner
held to be subrogated to right of materialman).
Contra: Maryland Cas. Co. v. Johnson, 15 F. (2d) 253, 255 (D.C. Mich. 1926), and authori-
ties cited therein.
In many of the cases cited in this footnote, the bond also contained a condition that the
work be delivered free from lien or that the owner be saved harmless from lien or reimbursed
therefor. Such cases are treated in sub-topic II-D, to be published in the second part of this
article, in the February number of the Raviaw.
Construction Bonds Given by Owner to Mortgagee. In analogy with the authorities cited in
this footnote, it is generally held that a surety bond, given by owner to a mortgagee and con-
ditioned not only on completion of the work of construction but also on the payment of per-
sons furnishing labor or materials, carries rights to such persons as beneficiaries. Johnston v.
Lindsey, 183 Ark. 466, 36 S.W. (2d) 396 (1931) (private construction); Woodhead Lumber Co.
v. E. G. Niemann Investments, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 456, 278 Pac. 913 (1929) (private construc-
tion; mortgage of obligee superior to any liens which might be acquired; judgment for sub-
contractor). The like law governs similar surety bonds given by the contractor to one having
a mortgage on property of the owner. Bristol Steel & Iron Works v. Plank, 178 S.E. 58 (Va.
1935).
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were not identified when the bond was given, 9 and although the bond
was not required by statute.99 This presumption or inference may be forti-
fied by circumstances, for example, that the bond is erroneously stated to
be given in obedience to a statute which requires a bond in the case of
construction of a different kind or at a different place and gives the ma-
terialman a right of action thereon; 0 0 or that the bond states that the
materialman shall have a right of action or that it be for his use or bene-
fit.' 0 It may be, however, that the suggested inference or presumption
is not recognized by a particular court or, if it be so recognized, that it is
rebutted by stipulation or other fact indicative of the contrary.0 2 It will
then be necessary to consider whether the materialman has other ways
of attacking the surety. In the comparatively rare case in which the
owner is personally obligated to the materialman, even though condi-
tionally (for example, on a guaranty), not only may the latter resort to
equitable execution if judgment be had against the owner and execution
at law be returned unsatisfied, or to some appropriate statutory method
of seizing an intangible asset of an obligor, but also he would be vested
with a present legal right against the surety under the rule of Lawrence v.
Fox.1b03 The rule of that case, however, seems not to have been extended
to cover the situation in which the promisee's liability to the plaintiff
consists merely in a lien on property. 0 4 May the materialman then have
relief in equity? It is true that he cannot here rely on equitable execution
98 Restatement of Contracts, § 139 (1932).
99 On principle, privity is not necessary, but, if it were, the requirement might well be re-
garded as fulfilled by a persona obligation running from owner to materialman, or by the lien
of the latter on the former's property.
zoo American Sur. Co. v. Smith, zoo Fla. 1012, 130 So. 440 (r930); Lake Charles Planing
Mill Co., Ltd., v. Grand Lodge, 127 La. 238, 53 So. 55o (1910).
,oX Getchell & Martin Lumber Co. v. Peterson & Sampson, 124 Iowa 599, zoo N.W. s5o.
(i9o4) ("firmly bound to all persons who may be injured by breach of conditions of this bond");
Lake Charles Planing Mill Co., Ltd., v. Grand Lodge, supra note zoo.
' Thus, a bond may contain a stipulation that it shall be for the benefit of the owner alone.
Such a stipulation should be given legal effect in the absence of a statutory provision to the
contrary.
In Weller v. Goble, 66 Iowa 113, 23 N.W. 290 (i885), the bond was conditioned on perform-
ance of the contract, which bound the principal to use the money received by him thereunder
in paying for labor and materials. In an action brought by a materialman against an individual
surety, judgment was given for the surety, first on the ground that it did not appear that the
amount due was sufficient to pay all materialmen and hence the plaintiff did not show damage,
and, secondly, that at any rate rights were not intended to accrue to materialmen as a class,
since the contract was not to pay al materialmen (fully or ratably) but only such as the con-
tractor might elect to pay in case the amount due turned out to be insufficient.
103 20 N.Y. 268 (1859); Restatement, Contracts, §§ 133-147 (1932).
104 Restatement, Contracts, §§ 133-247 (1932).
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or the like remedies. Nevertheless, the writer submits that he should be
given, as security for his claim against the contractor, a substantive
equitable interest in the right of the owner against the surety.05 The
writer finds supporting analogies in the equitable interest which a creditor
acquires in certain rights accruing to a surety from his principal or a
stranger.' Now it is true that the suggested result cannot be rested on
any theory that the owner is a surety for the contractor's surety to the
materialman, since that would be to assume that the surety is bound to
the materialman, the very matter in question. Nevertheless, because of
the lien resting on his property, the owner is a real surety for the con-
tractor to the materialman, and it is submitted that the materialman may
well be held equitably entitled to the right of the owner against the con-
tractor's surety for the following reasons: (a) It is a peculiar asset in the
hands of the owner, peculiar in this respect, that the benefit of the asset
must necessarily accrue to the materialman and cannot come to the owner
or his general creditors, the consequence being that it is valuable to the
materialman and no one else; (b) the suit prosecuted by the materialman
will relieve the owner from the burden of realizing on the asset, and pay-
ment as decreed in such suit will discharge the obligation of the owner
to the materialman and that of the surety to the owner; and (c) the rules
just referred to, governing a creditor's rights in securities and obligations
held by a surety, afford analogies sufficiently cogent to justify this exten-
sion.
In a few jurisdictions, however, the materialman is denied a right on
the bond on the ground that there is no intention to place rights in him
10s Of course, if the owner should pay the materialman, the latter's interest would cease and
the owner would have a cause of action against the surety (and the contractor) for his reim-
bursement, which could be reached by any creditor of the owner and would pass to his assignee
for creditors or trustee in bankruptcy.
-6 Thus, for the purpose of securing his claim against the principal, a creditor is held to have
an equitable interest in any security received by the surety from the principal even though the
creditor's right against the surety is merely a lien on the latter's property. (Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. Co. v. Trimble, 5i Md. 99, 113 (1879); and see Van Orden v. Durham, 35 Cal. 136
(1868) and Sherrod v. Dixon, 12o N.C. 40 (1897)). Moreover, there are cases in which the
creditor, having the personal obligation of the surety, is held entitled to a security res received
by the latter from a stranger conditioned on payment of the principal debt (Black v. Kaiser,
9I Ky. 422, 427, 16 S.W. 89, 90 (i89i); O'Neill v. State Say. Bank, 34 Mont. 521, 527, 87 Pac.
970, 971 (i9o6) (dkiam)), and to a bond or other obligation received by the surety from a
stranger and containing an undertaking or condition to pay the principal debt (Curtis v. Tyler,
9 Paige (N.Y.) 432 (1842); Merchants Nat. Bank v. Cumings, 149 N.Y.36o (z896); Goff v.Ladd,
i61 Cal. 257, 118 Pac. 792 (1g11) (placed on above stated ground and also on ground that the
creditor was a creditor-benefciary)). The position of the writer is that either analogy may be
extended to meet the present situation: the first to cover a personal obligation received from
a stranger, and the second to protect a creditor having a mere lien on property of a surety.
See note 45, to be published in the second part of this article, in the February number of the
RzVIEw.
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(but only in the owner for the latter's sole protection) X"7 or that legal
effect will not be given to such intention,' 8 or on both grounds."' 9
The coverage of the bonds considered in this sub-topic depends on their
proper interpretation. One question is whether a bond conditioned on the
payment of persons furnishing labor or materials protects a subcon-
tractor, that is, a person who engages with the principal contractor for the
doing of a part or all of the work and who thus incidentally furnishes labor
or materials, or whether it protects only a person who merely furnishes
labor or materials without undertaking the accomplishment of a result.
The better view is that the bond protects the subcontractor.1"
The question also arises whether persons furnishing labor or materials
to a subcontractor are within the coverage of the bond. If the bond is
broadly conditioned on paying the claims of persons furnishing labor or
material in or about the work, or in connection therewith, it seems to be
dear that such persons are within its coverage;"- but, if on the payment
of persons furnishing labor or materials to the contractor, it would seem
that the contrary position should be taken.X2
"07 Sun Ind. Co. v. American University, 58 App. D.C. 184, 26 F. (2d) 556 (1928) (the court
reasoning that in view of the limitation of liability there might be a conflict of interest between
owner and materialmen); Cleveland Metal Roofing & Ceiling Co. v. Gaspard, 89 Ohio St. z85,
195, ro6 N.E. 9, 12 (1g4), L.R.A. igiSA 768, 774. Ann. Cas. igz6A 745, 748 (court also
stressed lack of reliance; individual sureties), disapproved in Royal Ind. Co. v. Northern Ohio
Granite Co., ioo Ohio St. 373, 376, 126 N.E. 4o5, 12 A.L.R. 378, 38o (1919). Cf. authori-
ties infra, sub-topic H-D, note 43, to be published in the second part of this article, in the
February number of the Rnvrnw.
so& Central Supply Co. v. United States F. & G. Co., 273 Mass. 139, 173 N.E. 697 (1930).
tog First M. E. Church v. Isenberg, 246 Pa. 221, 92 Atl. 141 (i9z4); Dupont De Nemours
Powder Co. v. National Sur. Co., 90 Wash. 227, 232, 155 Pac. 1050, 1052 (zgi6), 94 Wash.
461, 464, z62 Pac. 866, 867 (1917).
110 Woodhead Lumber Co. v. E. G. Niemann Investments, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 456, 278 Pac.
913 (1929) (surety bond given by owner to mortgagee); Johnson Electric Co., Inc., v. Columbia.
Cas. Co., zoi Fla. i86, 133 So. 850 (1931); Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. v. W. & J. Knox Co., 15o
Md. 4o, 47, 132 At]. 261, 263 (1926); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. The Stamberger Co., 37 Ohio App.
236, 239, 174 N.E. 629, 631 (1930).
In Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Carey & Boettner, 145 La. 773, 82 So. 887 (919), a
bond executed by a surety company was conditioned on payment of subcontractors; strangely
enough, it was held not to protect a materialman, though the promisees therein included sub-
contractors and materialmen; the court improperly relied on the doctrine of stridissimijuris.
' Pacific States Electric Co. v. United States F. & G. Co., 1o9 Cal. App. 691, 695, 293 Pac.
812, 813 (1930) (arguendo).
"' No case has been found in which this question was decided.
American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Lee & Kincaid Coal Co., 226 Ala. 262, 146 So. 4o8 (933),
is not contra to the proposition of the text; in that case a bond was given by P-2, a subcontrac-
tor with S-2 as surety, to S-i, the surety of the principal contractor (in public construction), con-
ditioned on payment of persons furnishing materials to P-2, but also importing as wide cover-
age as the bond executed by S-i. Since that bond would have protected persons furnishing
materials to a subcontractor, it was held that a person furnishing materials to P- 3 , a subcon-
tractor of P-2, should recover from S-2.
[To be concluded]
